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Abstract
A general model for wiretap multi-way channels is introduced that includes several previously
studied models in information theoretic security as special cases. A new upper bound is developed
that generalizes and unifies previous bounds. We also introduce a multivariate dependence
balance bound which is of independent interest.
1 Introduction
A wiretap multi-way channel (WiMWC) with k transceiver terminals and an eavesdropper is de-
fined by p(y[k], z|x[k]) where xi and yi are the respective channel inputs and outputs of the i-th
legitimate transmitter, and z is the eavesdropper channel output. Let [k] = {1, 2, · · · , k} and
x[k] = (x1, · · · , xk). Extra public or private discussion/feedback links can be included by L parallel
channels qℓ(y[k], z|x[k]), ℓ ∈ [L], that the legitimate terminals can use in addition to the main chan-
nel p(y[k], z|x[k]). For instance, to model a noiseless public channel one may add a parallel channel
Y1 = Y2 = · · · = Yk = Z = X[k].
A WiMWC code of length n is defined as follows: at time instance j ∈ [n], the i-th legitimate
terminal uses local (private) random strings Wi and transmits the symbol
Xij = fij(Wi, Yi[j−1]), j ∈ [n] (1)
over the main channel p(y[k], z|x[k]) or over one of the parallel channels qi(y[k], z|x[k]). Here, n is
the number of transmissions and fij(·) is the encoding function at terminal i for time j, and Yij is
the channel output symbols seen by terminal i at time j. Random variable Yi[j−1] (also sometimes
denoted by Y j−1i in the paper) is the collection of past outputs of terminal i at time j. Suppose that
the main channel is used m ≤ n times during the n transmissions, while the channel qℓ(y[k], z|x[k])
is used mℓ times for ℓ = 1, 2, · · · , L. Thus, m+
∑L
ℓ=1mℓ = n.
After transmission, a subset of the terminals – without loss of generality assumed to be the first
r terminals – generate the secret keys
Si = gi(Wi, Yi[n]), i ∈ [r]
where Si ∈ [2
mRs ] for some Rs > 0. In an (n, ǫ) code, the generated keys satisfy
1
m
H(S1) ≥ Rs − ǫ, P[S1 = S2 = · · · = Sr] ≥ 1− ǫ,
1
m
I(S1;Z
n) ≤ ǫ.
The number Rs is called the secret key rate, and
αℓ =
mℓ
m
(2)
1
is the rate of channel use for qℓ(y[k], z|x[k]). Given αℓ ≥ 0 for ℓ ∈ [L], we are interested in the
supremum of rates Rs that can be achieved for any ǫ > 0 as m tends to infinity.
Observe that while terminals r + 1, r + 2, · · · , k do not generate secret keys, they have channel
inputs and can participate as helper terminals. If the secret key generated by the first r terminals
must be kept private from a collection of helper terminals, then the outputs of these terminals can
be included as part of the eavesdropper’s output variable Z.
The WiMWC includes several models as special cases.
• Source model: consider k = 2 and setX1,X2 to be constant in the main channel p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2).
Take an extra channel to allow for public discussion, and let α1 (as defined in (2)) tend to
infinity. Similarly, the multiuser case studied in [1] is a special case of the WiMWC model.
• Channel model: consider k = 2 and set Y1 and X2 to be constant in the main channel
p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2). Take an extra channel to allow for public discussion and let α1 tend to
infinity. Similarly, the multiaccess channel model ( [2, 3]) for which each legitimate terminal
is either a receiver or transmitter can be enforced by choosing the alphabets of either Xi or
Yi to have only one element. As shown in [2, 3], the secret key capacity is related to MACs
with feedback for the special cases considered in these works. Our result provides connections
between the key agreement problem and MACs with feedback in a more general setting.
• Wiretap channels with or without (private or public) feedback: For instance, for a secure rate-
limited feedback link as in [4], we can set k = 2 and consider a parallel channel where Y2 and
Z are constant while Y1 = X2 with the desired feedback rate. The Gaussian wiretap two-way
channel [5] is obtained when we do not have any parallel channels and k = 2. Similarly, one
can obtain the models considered in [6–9] as special cases of the WiMWC model. The channel
model of [10] also reduces to the model considered here if the parallel channels model a public
channel available to all parties.
2 New Upper Bound
Definition 1 (Fractional Partition). Let B be the set of all non-empty proper subsets of [k]. A
fractional partition of [k] is a collection of non-negative weights associated to non-empty proper
subsets of [k], i.e., λB for every B ∈ B such that∑
B: i∈B
λB = 1, ∀i ∈ [k]. (3)
Definition 2 (Multivariate Mutual Information). Let (λB : B ∈ B) be an arbitrary fractional
partition of [k]. The λ-mutual information among variables Xi, i ∈ [k] conditioned on another
random variable T is
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk|T ) = H(X[k]|T )−
∑
B
λBH(XB|XBc , T ).
The above definition first appeared in [1, Equation 6]. Observe that when k = 2 and λ{1} =
λ{2} = 1, the λ-mutual information reduces to the ordinary conditional mutual information. Basic
properties of Iλ are discussed in Appendix A. In particular, a dependence balance lemma for Iλ is
given in Appendix C.
Take some arbitrary alphabet set T and an auxiliary random variable T ∈ T defined by a
conditional distribution q(t|y[k], z, x[k]). We call T an auxiliary receiver.
2
Definition 3. Given a fractional partition λ, a multiway wiretap channel q(y[k], z|x[k]) and an
auxiliary receiver T described by q(t|y[k], z, x[k]), let
Vλ(q) = max Iλ(X1Y1;X2Y2; · · · ;XkYk|T )− Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) + I(V ;T |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
where the maximum is over all p(x[k], u, v, y[k], z, t) of the form:
p(x[k], u, v, y[k], z, t) = p(x[k])q(y[k], z, t|x[k])p(u, v|x[k], y[k]).
Theorem 4. Take an arbitrary fractional partition such that λB = 0 when [r] ⊂ B. Then, for
any arbitrary auxiliary receiver qT |X[k],Y[k],Z, the secret key capacity of the multiway wiretap channel
q(y[k], z|x[k]) is bounded from above by
V
(
p(y[k], z, t|x[k])q(t|x[k], y[k], z)
)
+
L∑
ℓ=1
αℓV
(
qℓ(y[k], z, t|x[k])q(t|x[k], y[k], z)
)
,
where αℓ is defined in (2).
Remark 5. This converse recovers the best known upper bound for the source and channel models
as special cases (for this special case, V
(
qℓ(y[k], z, t|x[k])q(t|x[k], y[k], z)
)
vanishes) [11,12], and also
recovers the converse for the result in [4]. If we set T = Z, we get a bound that can be also deduced
from Theorem 3.1 of [13]. The converse utilizes an auxiliary receiver T . See [14] for some further
applications of auxiliary receivers.
Proof. Take some arbitrary q(t|x[k], y[k], z). Take some arbitrary code and let T
n be defined by
passing X[k]j, Y[k]j, Zj through the memoryless channel q(t|x[k], y[k], z) for j ∈ [n].
Let Si for i ∈ [r] be the key produced by the first r terminals. Set Si for r < i ≤ k to be
constants. We have
H(S1)− nk1(ǫ) ≤ H(S1)− I(S1;Z
n) (4)
= H(S1|T
n) + I(S1;T
n)− I(S1;Z
n)− nk2(ǫ) (5)
where k1(ǫ) and k2(ǫ) are functions that tend to zero as ǫ tends to zero. Observe that
I(S1;T
n)− I(S1;Z
n) =
∑
i
I(S1;Tj |Z
n
j+1, T
j−1)− I(S1;Zj |Z
n
j+1, T
j−1) (6)
=
∑
j
I(Vj ;Tj |UjTj)− I(Vj ;Zj |UjTj) (7)
where Vj = S1, Uj = Z
n
j+1 and Tj = T
j−1. Observe that
UjVjTj → X[k]jY[k]j → TjZj
forms a Markov chain. Next, we have
H(S1|T
n)− nk3(ǫ) ≤ Iλ(S1;S2; · · · ;Sk|T
n) (8)
≤ Iλ(W1Y
n
1 ;W2Y
n
2 ; · · · ;WkY
n
k |T
n) (9)
= Iλ(W1Y
n
1 ;W2Y
n
2 ; · · · ;WkY
n
k |T
n)− Iλ(W1;W2; · · · ;Wk) (10)
3
≤
n∑
j=1
Iλ(X1jY1j ;X2jY2j ; · · · ;XkjYkj|Tj , T
j−1)−
n∑
i=1
Iλ(X1j ;X2j ; · · · ;Xkj |T
j−1) (11)
where (8) and (9) follow from the Fano and data processing inequalities for Iλ, as shown in Propo-
sition 6 in Appendix A, and (11) follows from Lemma 9 in Appendix C, and k3(ǫ) is a function that
tends to zero as ǫ tends to zero.
Collecting the above results, we obtain
H(S1)− nk1(ǫ)− nk2(ǫ)
≤
n∑
j=1
(
Iλ(X1jY1j ;X2jY2j ; · · · ;XkjYkj|Tj , Tj)− Iλ(X1j ;X2j ; · · · ;Xkj |Tj)
+ I(Vj ;Tj |UjTj)− I(Vj ;Zj |UjTj)
)
. (12)
Finally, observe that if at time j, the main channel p(y[k], z, t|x[k]) is used, the expression inside
parenthesis in (12) is bounded from above by
V
(
p(y[k], z, t|x[k])q(t|x[k], y[k], k)
)
while if the qℓ(y[k], z, t|x[k]) is used, the expression inside parenthesis in (12) is bounded from above
by
V
(
qℓ(y[k], z, t|x[k])q(t|x[k], y[k], k)
)
.
This completes the proof.
Appendices
A Properties of λ-k-mutual information
The properties in the following proposition essentially follow from the arguments in [1]. We include
their proofs for completeness.
Proposition 6. λ-k-mutual information satisfies the following properties:
• (Nonnegativity): Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) ≥ 0
• (Fano): Let A = {i1, i2, · · · , ir} be an arbitrary subset of [k]. Assume that Xj is constant
when j /∈ A, and
P[Xi1 = Xi2 = · · · = Xir ] ≥ 1− ǫ.
Take a fractional partition such that λB = 0 when A ⊂ B. Then
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) ≥ H(XA)−
(∑
B
λB
)(
H2(ǫ) + ǫ
∑
i∈A
log(|Xi|)
)
,
where H2(·) is the binary entropy function.
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• (Data processing): if we locally produce Yi from Xi, then
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) ≥ Iλ(Y1;Y2; · · · ;Yk).
Proof. For non-negativity, we have
H(X1X2 · · ·Xk) =
∑
i
H(Xi|X
i−1)
=
∑
i
(
∑
B:i∈B
λB)H(Xi|X
i−1)
=
∑
B
∑
i∈B
λBH(Xi|X
i−1)
≥
∑
B
∑
i∈B
λBH(Xi|X[i−1]∩BXBc)
=
∑
B
λBH(XB|XBc).
To show the Fano’s property, observe that λB 6= 0 implies B
c ∩ A 6= ∅. Using Fano’s inequality
we have
H(XB|XBc) ≤ H(XB|XBc∩A) ≤ H2(ǫ) + ǫ
∑
i∈[k]
log(|Xi|).
Finally, we show the data processing property: since adding private noise to variables does not
change the λ-k-information, it suffices to show this claim when Yi is a function of Xi. In this case,
we have
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) = H(X[k])−
∑
B
λBH(XB|XBc)
= H(Y[k])−
∑
B
λBH(YB|YBcXBc)
+H(X[k]|Y[k])−
∑
B
λBH(XB|YBXBc)
= H(Y[k])−
∑
B
λBH(YB|YBc) +
∑
B
λBI(YB;XBc |YBc)
+H(X[k]|Y[k])−
∑
B
λBH(XB|Y[k]XBc)
= Iλ(Y1;Y2; · · · ;Yk) + Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk|Y[k]) +
∑
B
λBI(YB;XBc |YBc)
≥ Iλ(Y1;Y2; · · · ;Yk).
where
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk|Y[k]) =
∑
y[k]
p(y[k])Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk|Y[k] = y[k])
is defined just like the ordinary mutual information.
It is further shown in [1, Lemma A.1] that Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) is concave in p(x1) for a fixed
p(x2, x3, · · · , xk|x1). An interactive communication property of Iλ can be also deduced from Lemma
6 of [3].
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B Relation to another definition of k-mutual information
Define the k-mutual information for the random variables X1,X2, · · · ,Xk as
J(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) = −H(X1 · · ·Xk) +
∑
i
H(Xi).
Example 7. Let λB = 0 if |B| 6= k − 1, and λB =
1
k−1 otherwise. We have
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) = H(X1X2 · · ·Xk)−
1
k − 1
∑
i
H(Xi|X[k]−i) (13)
=
1
k − 1
(
−H(X1 · · ·Xk) +
∑
i
H(Xi)
)
(14)
=
1
k − 1
J(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk). (15)
Next, let Π = (P1,P2, · · · ,Pr) be a partition of [k] into r ≥ 2 sets. Let λB =
1
r−1 if B = [k] − Pi
for some i ∈ [r], and λB = 0 otherwise. We have
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) =
1
r − 1
J(XP1 ;XP2 ; · · · ;XPr ). (16)
The following theorem complements Example 7.
Theorem 8. [15, Theorem 4.1] For any fractional partition λB and any X1,X2, · · · ,Xk, we have
Iλ(X1;X2; · · · ;Xk) ≥ min
Π
1
r − 1
J(XP1 ;XP2 ; · · · ;XPr )
where the minimum is over all r ≥ 2 and over all partitions Π = (P1,P2, · · · ,Pr) of [k] into r sets.
C A Dependence Balance Bound for Iλ
Lemma 9. Given random variables Wi,Xij , Yij and Zj for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [n] satisfying
Xij = fij(Wi, Yi[j−1]), i ∈ [k], j ∈ [n] (17)
and the Markov chain
W[k]Y
j−1
[k] Z
j−1 → X[k]j → ZjY[k]j, j ∈ [n]
we have
Iλ(W1Y
n
1 ;W2Y
n
2 ; · · · ;WkY
n
k |Z
n)− Iλ(W1;W2; · · · ;Wk)
≤
n∑
j=1
Iλ(X1jY1j;X2jY2j; · · · ;XkjYkj|Zj, Z
j−1)−
n∑
j=1
Iλ(X1j ;X2j ; · · · ;Xkj |Z
j−1).
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Proof. We have
Iλ(W1Y
n
1 ;W2Y
n
2 ; · · · ;WkY
n
k |Z
n)− Iλ(W1;W2; · · · ;Wk)
=
n∑
j=1
[
Iλ(W1Y
j
1 ;W2Y
j
2 ; · · · ;WkY
j
k |Z
j)− Iλ(W1Y
j−1
1 ;W2Y
j−1
2 ; · · · ;WkY
j−1
k |Z
j−1)
]
=
n∑
j=1
[
(1−
∑
B
λB)
(
H(W[k]Y
j
[k]|Z
j)−H(W[k]Y
j−1
[k] |Z
j−1)
)
+
∑
B
λB
(
H(WBcY
j
Bc |Z
j)−H(WBcY
j−1
Bc |Z
j−1)
)]
=
n∑
j=1
[
(1−
∑
B
λB)
(
H(Y[k],j|X[k],jZ
j)− I(Zj ;X[k],j|Z
j−1)
)
+
∑
B
λB
(
H(YBc,j|XBc,jWBcY
j−1
Bc Z
j)− I(Zj ;XBc,jWBcY
j−1
Bc |Z
j−1)
)]
≤
n∑
j=1
[
(1−
∑
B
λB)
(
H(Y[k],j|X[k],jZ
j)− I(Zj ;X[k],j|Z
j−1)
)
+
∑
B
λB
(
H(YBc,j|XBc,jZ
j)− I(Zj ;XBc,j|Z
j−1)
)]
=
n∑
j=1
[
(1−
∑
B
λB)
(
H(X[k],jY[k],j|Z
j)−H(X[k],j|Z
j−1)
)
+
∑
B
λB
(
H(XBc,jYBc,j|Z
j)−H(XBc,j|Z
j−1)
)]
=
n∑
j=1
[
Iλ(X1jY1j ;X2jY2j ; · · · ;XkjYkj|Zj , Z
j−1)− Iλ(X1j ;X2j ; · · · ;Xkj |Z
j−1)
]
.
Even though we use Lemma 9 in the context of key agreement rate, it is of independent interest.
For example, one can apply Lemma 9 to a k-user MAC with generalized feedback
p(yF1 , yF2 , · · · , yFk , y|x1, x2, · · · , xk).
Here the Xi’s are channel inputs and the YFi ’s are the noisy feedback that they receive. The receiver
sees Y . Suppose first that YFi = Y for all i which gives an ordinary MAC with feedback. In this
case, Lemma 9 recovers the “refined dependence balance equations” of [16] as we vary λ. Lemma 9
also implies the following outer bound:
Theorem 10. Consider a MAC with two-users with generalized feedback of the form YF1 = (Y, Y˜F1)
and YF2 = (Y, Y˜F2). Then, any achievable rate pair (R1, R2) satisfies{
(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ I(X1;Y, Y˜F2 |X2, T1, T2) (18)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y, Y˜F1 |X1, T1, T2) (19)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1,X2;Y, Y˜F1 , Y˜F2 |T1, T2) (20)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1,X2;Y |T1)
}
(21)
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for some p(t1, t2, x1, x2) satisfying
I(X1;X2|T1, T2) ≤ I(X1;X2|Y, Y˜F1 , Y˜F2 , T1, T2) (22)
I(X1;X2|T1) ≤ I(X1, Y˜F1 ;X2, Y˜F2 |T1, Y ) (23)
Moreover, one can assume that |T1| ≤ 5 and |T2| ≤ |X1||X2|+ 3.
This bound reduces to the bound given in Theorem 1 of [17] if we drop the constraint (23). The
bound is proved by choosing T1 = (Q,Y
Q−1) and T2 = (Y˜
Q−1
F1
, Y˜ Q−1F2 ) where Q is the time-sharing
variable. Equations (18)-(20) and (22) follow from Theorem 1 of [17]. Equations (21) and (23)
are new. We show these two equations for an arbitrary k-user MAC. Let Mi be the message of
transmitter i. Then, Lemma 9 implies
0 ≤ Iλ(M1Y
n
F1
;M2Y
n
F2
; · · · ;MkY
n
Fk
|Y n)− Iλ(M1;M2; · · · ;Mk)
≤
n∑
j=1
Iλ(X1jYF1j ;X2jYF2j ; · · · ;XkjYFkj|Yj , Y
j−1)−
n∑
j=1
Iλ(X1j ;X2j ; · · · ;Xkj |Y
j−1)
Next, we also have
n
k∑
i=1
Ri = H(M[k]) (24)
= I(M[k];Y
n) + nk(ǫ) (25)
=
n∑
j=1
I(M[k];Yj |Y
j−1) (26)
≤
n∑
j=1
I(M[k]Y
j−1
F[k]
;Yj |Y
j−1) (27)
=
n∑
j=1
I(M[k]Y
j−1
F[k]
X[k];Yj |Y
j−1) (28)
=
n∑
j=1
I(X[k];Yj |Y
j−1) (29)
Letting T1 = (Q,Y
Q−1) for a time sharing variable Q gives the desired bound.
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